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The Lawful Access Fallacy:
Voluntary Warrantless Disclosures, Customer Privacy,
and Government Requests for Subscriber Information
Matthew P. Ponsford*
I. INTRODUCTION TO LAWFUL ACCESS IN CANADA
Lawful access to information is a broad and complex field raising significant
civil rights and privacy issues for the Canadian public. The concept refers to
intercepting communications and the legal authority to engage in the search and
seizure of sensitive information for lawful investigative purposes. Authorities are
increasingly accessing information from transmissions data or electronically
intercepting telecommunication services by utilizing new Criminal Code powers
to demand, order, and compel the preservation of electronic evidence. 1
Legislation has also expanded and streamlined the warrant process enabling
authorities to intercept private communications.2 This analysis focuses on the
relationship among lawful access, customer privacy, and the publication of
government requests for subscriber information. Bill C-30, introduced in 2012,
and later shelved following public outcry, forms the controversial backdrop to
the discussion.3 This legislation would have ‘‘modernized” the Criminal Code by
permitting warrantless powers over, namely, the obligatory disclosure of internet
subscriber information, including one’s name, address, telephone number, email
address, and Internet Protocol (IP) address. The bill was widely condemned, yet
unprecedented levels of warrantless requests continue. This paper explores the
recent legal, political, privacy, and communications developments surrounding
warrantless government requests for basic subscriber information. I assert the
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Ibid.
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Internet Surveillance Bill C-30”, iPOLITICS (11 February 2013), online: <www.ipolitics.ca/2013/02/11/conservatives-kill-internet-surveillance-bill-c-30> [Bill C-30].
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current practice remains marred in secrecy and therefore poses a significant
threat to Canadian civil liberties and privacy rights.

II. WARRANTLESS ACCESS TO BASIC SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION
FOLLOWING BILL C-30
Current warrant requirements contain expanded investigative powers and
reduced evidentiary burdens.4 Few Canadians are aware of recent trends.
Government agencies routinely receive warrantless access to internet subscriber
information (ISI) despite the apparent illegality of the practice. 5 Canadian
telecommunications service providers (TSPs) and internet companies regularly
hand over ISI ‘‘hundreds of times every day”6 and are compensated for
complying with requests. Fees purportedly support the special databases
companies have created to enable expeditious access by government agencies.
Previously, Charmaine Borg, a Member of Parliament for the New Democratic
Party, pushed for information regarding the number of requests that companies
receive.7 Companies still largely refuse to disclose that information. One
government agency, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), released
data indicating that it made 18,849 subscriber requests in one year alone. These
requests were complied with 99.9% of the time: 18,824 of 18,849, which included
call records and geo-location data.8 The CBSA paid $1–$3 compensation per
request, which totalled roughly $24,211. In 2010, the RCMP similarly made over
28,000 warrantless subscriber requests.9 This practice raises significant legal,
constitutional, ethical, and privacy concerns for Canadians. Confidential ISI is
still disclosed to government agencies and operatives without the knowledge or
consent of people within Canada.
The development and creation of ‘‘law enforcement databases” is also
disconcerting to privacy experts, yet companies continue developing improved
intercept-capable transmission apparatuses to support lawful access. The
paradox is that new technologies and developments are primarily being used
for warrantless ISI requests. For example, the Competition Bureau
acknowledged accessing Bell Canada’s database 20 times in 2012–2013.10 The
‘‘no civil or criminal liability” provision remains law for the voluntary disclosure
of subscriber information, as does s. 487.0195(1), which states that no production
order is necessary for peace officers or public officers’ requests for voluntary
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See Online Crime Act, supra note 1, s 2.
Michael Geist, ‘‘Internet data routinely handed over without a warrant: Geist”, Toronto
Star (28 March 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/business/tech_news/2014/03/28/
internet_data_routinely_handed_over_without _a_warrant_geist.html> [Geist].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

THE LAWFUL ACCESS FALLACY

155

disclosure ‘‘that the person is not prohibited by law from disclosing.” 11 The
government has confronted criticisms of these provisions by stating that
warrantless disclosures are permissible through exceptions found in ‘‘private
sector privacy law,”12 but it seems that it is hard to justify such wide-scale
practices with significant privacy implications.

III. THE CRIMINAL CODE AND R V SPENCER:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The warrantless voluntary disclosure process has typically not employed
Criminal Code provisions as justification, namely s 487.014 (a ‘‘general
production order”),13 which can permit a justice or judge to issue an ex parte
document production order. Around the same time Bills C-13 (lawful access) and
S-4 (amending the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act)14 were debated, the Supreme Court of Canada released R v Spencer,15 a
unanimous decision regarding the voluntary and warrantless disclosure of basic
subscriber information. The Court reaffirmed internet and informational
privacy, including the right to anonymity and a warrant requirement except
under ‘‘exigent circumstances or where authorized by a reasonable law” and
confirmed a reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information. 16 In the
context of obtaining court orders and search warrants, although the Online
Crime Act’s ‘‘reasonable grounds to suspect” threshold is now less stringent than
the former ‘‘reasonable grounds to believe,”17 the landmark Spencer decision
held that obtaining subscriber information through means other than a warrant
is an unlawful search and unconstitutional.

11

12
13
14

15
16
17

Online Crime Act, supra note 1, s 487.0195(1). See also s 487.0195(2): ‘‘A person who
preserves data or provides a document in those circumstances does not incur any
criminal or civil liability for doing so.”
Geist, supra note 5.
Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 487.014.
See Bill C-13, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the
Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 2nd Sess, 41st
Parl, 2014 (assented to 9 December 2014) [Bill C-13]; Bill S-4, An Act to amend the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and to make a
consequential amendment to another Act, 2nd Sess, 41st Parl, 2015 (assented to 18 June
2015) [Bill S-4]. See also Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act,
SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].
R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, [2014] 2 SCR 212, 312 CCC (3d) 215 [Spencer].
Ibid at paras 50, 62, 65–68, 71–74, quote at 71.
See e.g., Online Crime Act, supra note 1; Criminal Code, supra note 1, ss 487.017(2),(3) as
it appeared and was in force until December 9, 2014; Forms 5.004, 5.007. See also
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Communications (Markham, Ont: LexisNexis Canada,
2014) at HCS-107 ‘‘Lawful Access to Information” (2014 Reissue).
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IV. OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER AND PIPEDA:
THE PRIVACY CONCERNS
The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) has stated that IP addresses
are personal information if connected to identifiable individuals,18 in addition to
customer names and physical addresses, especially in the internet context.
Anonymous information can easily be linked to identifiable users.19 Sections 5 to
7 of PIPEDA20 outline the protection of personal information relevant to private
organizations such as telecommunications service providers (TSPs) and internet
companies. Section 5(3) states that an ‘‘organization may collect, use or disclose
personal information only for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
are appropriate in the circumstances.”21 Bulk government voluntary disclosure
requests are not consistent with this principle.
Section 7(3) outlines permissible grounds for disclosure of personal
information without knowledge or consent.22 Section 7(3)(c) permits disclosure
if the company is ‘‘required to comply with a subpoena or warrant issued or an
order made by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the
production of information, or to comply with rules of court relating to the
production of records.”23 Section 7(3)(c.1) is another option. Compliance
requires government institutions to identify its lawful authority and indicate the
purposes for obtaining information: for reasons of national security, Canadian
defence, or international affairs (s 7(3)(c.1)(i)); for the purpose of enforcing
Canadian law or domestic/foreign investigations relating to same, including
intelligence gathering (s 7(3)(c.1)(ii)); or to administer Canadian or provincial
laws (s 7(3)(c.1)(iii)). Moreover, in specific instances, TSPs and internet
companies can initiate disclosure with regards to contraventions of Canadian
law, national security, or victims of financial abuse.24 Current disclosure requests
are, presumably, government-initiated. Absent companies or customers verifying
‘‘lawful authority” disclosures, government institutions may continue to violate
Canadian privacy legislation.
Interestingly, a proposed ‘‘lawful authority” provision contained in Bill C-12
(2011) was removed prior to the enactment of Bill S-4 (2015).25 The original text
contained pros and cons: the previous provision added specificity and clarity
18
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20
21
22
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Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Metadata and Privacy: A Technical
and Legal Overview” (30 October 2014), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/
research-recherche/2014/md_201410_e.pdf> at 6-7.
Spencer, supra note 15 at paras 13-20.
PIPEDA, supra note 14, ss 5-7.
Ibid, s 5(3).
Ibid, s 7(3)(a)–(i).
Ibid, s 7(3)(c).
Ibid, s 7(3)(c.1), (d), (d.3).
Bill C-12, An Act to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011 (last stage completed: first reading) [Bill C-12].
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(i.e., s 3.1(a) ‘‘lawful authority refers to. . .”) while the provision also stipulated at
s 3.1(b) that ‘‘the organization that discloses the personal information is not
required to verify the validity of the lawful authority identified by the
government institution or the part of a government institution.”26 Bill S-4 was
adopted in 2015 and lawful authority remains undefined. The term was implied
to mean lawful authority other than a subpoena, warrant, or order, by a court,
person or body, and outside the rules of court necessitating records production.
The omission of the term entirely is a significant oversight. 27 I suggest future
legislative amendment should include explicit mention and greater certainty of
what constitutes ‘‘lawful authority” to complement Spencer’s interpretation of
the term.
Finally, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not explicitly
mention personal information protection or privacy; however, s 7 (‘‘the right to
life, liberty and security of person”) and s 8 (‘‘the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure”) also offer protection in instances of unlawful
access to subscriber information.28 There are strong grounds for constitutional
challenges against various government agencies as well as class-action lawsuits.

V. TRANSPARENCY REPORTS: DISCLOSURE PUBLICATIONS FROM
TSPs AND GOVERNMENT
The reporting of voluntary warrantless disclosures presents a two-prong
transparency challenge: the first is the need for more transparency regarding the
number of government requests for subscriber information, and the second is the
need for telecommunications to publicize the frequency of disclosures to
governments. In 2011, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC)
submitted requests to 14 companies inquiring about the frequency in which
they were asked to share customers’ data with law enforcement. Nine companies
provided data aggregating 1.2 million requests, approximately 3,290 per day
(2011). Several companies pooled their request numbers together to avoid further
investigation, which contributed to the OPC secretly withholding data for three
years (since December 2011).29 At the time, Bill Abbott, who was Bell Canada’s
senior counsel and privacy ombudsman stated:
We are walking a delicate line between supporting privacy and not
antagonizing (the federal department of) Public Safety/LEAs (law
enforcement agencies) so the materials will be pretty factual, not much
commentary.30
26
27
28

29

Ibid, s (3.1)(b).
Ibid, s (3.1)(a)(i)–(ii).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Alex Boutilier, ‘‘Telecom Giants Worried about ‘Antagonizing’ Feds on Lawful Access:
Documents”, Toronto Star (21 May 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/
2014/05/21/telecom_giants_worried_about_ antagonizing_feds_on_lawful_access_documents.html>.
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The OPC claimed to have made numerous requests to telecom companies
regarding government snooping, yet the same office approved the companies’
‘‘aggregation of data” strategy. Bell Canada stated it was only contacted once by
the OPC and wanted legal advice and specific guidance on what they could
disclose. Rogers raised similar concerns of no precedent or guidance for the
request(s).31 This is one area where ISPs and TSPs do raise valid concerns.
Aggregation of data to the OPC partially resulted from uncertainty, but public
relations concerns were and are a serious risk-management incentive. Rogers,
TELUS and TekSavvy were among the first TSPs to release transparency
reports, followed by SaskTel, MTS Allstream and Wind Mobile. 32 As of 2014,
Bell Canada and Shaw Communications refused.33 Rogers received 174,917
requests in 201334 and 113,655 in 201435; it is uncertain how many requests the
company satisfied. In 2013, Telus received 103,462 law enforcement and
government requests for customer information, but refused to disclose how
many requests it complied with. Telus called for an ‘‘industry-wide” reporting
standard.36 Data from 2013 suggests a 1:72 ‘‘ratio of requests to customers” for
Rogers and 1:120 for Telus.37 Both Rogers and Telus promised to publish the
number of requests complied with in future reports since ‘‘its systems were not set
up to track that information at the time.”38 Historical controversies could be
swept under the rug without continued public pressure.
Critics argue the OPC is complicit in contested warrantless requests and not
fully utilizing its regulatory powers. The sheer number of requests is shocking but
relatively meaningless without more information about which, and how often,
government and law enforcement agencies were and are requesting customer
information. Many Canadians are unaware of this pervasive problem. Although
the voluntary disclosure in response to government requests for information do
not require warrants under new laws,39 the practice sharply conflicts with
30
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39

Ibid.
Ibid.
Amber Hildebrandt, ‘‘Police Asked Telcos for Client Data in Over 80% of Criminal
Probes”, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) News (10 April 2015), online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/technology/police-asked-telcos-for-client-data-in-over-80-ofcriminal-probes-1.3025055>.
Christine Dobby, ‘‘Telus joins transparency push by sharing demands for customer
info”, The Globe and Mail (18 September 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/
report-on-business/telus-joins-transparency-push-by-sharing-fed-demands-for-customer-info/article20650829> [Dobby].
Ibid.
Rogers, 2014 Rogers Transparency Report, online: <www.rogers.com/consumer/
privacy-crtc>.
Dobby, supra note 33.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Online Crime Act, supra note 1.
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Spencer, which ruled warrants are required in most cases where subscriber
information is sought. I suggest developing and implementing similar protocols
to PIPEDA’s privacy breach disclosure requirements for private companies. This
would add an additional safeguard for the public’s privacy in the context of
voluntary disclosures.
Similar issues are being adjudicated in the context of cell phone data. In the
2016 case of R v Rogers,40 Justice Sproat refused a sweeping police search
warrant request, which would have provided authorities with information about
40,000 Rogers and Telus customers. Telus described the police request as the
most extensive demand ever received.41 The decision highlights the important
relationship between law enforcement agencies and the telecommunications
sector as the gatekeeper to extensive public information. Following Spencer,
many TSPs and internet companies adjusted their policies to require warrants
and court orders from government agencies prior to granting basic subscriber
information, such as customer names and address checks, yet law enforcement
and government agency policies have not kept pace with private sector
developments. In fact, in addition to diminished transparency from
government, agencies such as Public Safety Canada are placing restrictions on
private companies to prevent the publication of private sector transparency reports.
Canadians deserve more accountability from their government.
In June, 2015, Industry Canada (reorganized as Innovation, Science and
Economic Development Canada under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau)
published Transparency Reporting Guidelines, which included guidance for
‘‘voluntary disclosures at the request of a government organization.” 42
Meaningful multi-stakeholder consultations did not take place.43 The initiative
is criticized because companies are not compelled to produce reports — instead,
it relies on ‘‘corporate generosity” — nor are they required to expand subscriber
notification or disclose compensation tariffs.44 The government has also failed to
update its own reporting. One suggestion is for Parliament to amend the
Criminal Code, requiring ‘‘government agencies to record and publicly report on
their use of non-interception modes of surveillance.”45
40

41

42
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R v Rogers Communications Partnership, 2016 ONSC 70, 2016 CarswellOnt 442, 128 OR
(3d) 692 (SCJ) at para 42 (testing the constitutionality of ‘‘tower dumps”) [R v Rogers].
Mike Crawley, ‘‘Police sweeps of cellphone records violate privacy rights, judge rules”,
CBC News (14 January 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/cellphoneprivacy-ruling-1.3403550>.
Government of Canada, Transparency Reporting Guidelines, (2015) Industry Canada
(now Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada), online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/vwapj/transparency-reporting-guidelines-2015.pdf/$file/transparency-reporting-guidelines-2015.pdf>.
Christopher Parsons, ‘‘Industry Canada Transparency Report Guidelines Intensely
Problematic”, Telecom Transparency Project (30 June 2015), online: <www.telecomtransparency.org/industry-canada-transparency-report-guidelines-intensely-problematic>.
Ibid.
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Although most companies have adjusted their policies, it is unclear if and
how many are still granting warrantless access to authorities. Indeed, depending
on the company, there is a patchwork of practices and inconsistent application of
voluntary disclosure rules. And further, ‘‘the fact that Internet providers may
have revealed such information in the past does not provide a compelling reason
to eliminate the critical safeguards provided by the warrant process.” 46
Additionally, if and when warrantless voluntary disclosures are sought,
information is likely inadmissible in legal proceedings since it constitutes an
illegal search.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The judiciary and civil society serve important functions since each ensures
that government power is curbed. Although law enforcement and security
agencies demand new powers — asserting barriers to obtaining subscriber
information ‘‘expeditiously” — the claims are largely unsubstantiated. Law
enforcement should bear the onus and burden of proof to demonstrate how
current laws impede investigations.
Parliament enacted PIPEDA to strike a balance between privacy rights and
cybercrime, and instructed ISPs to respect court orders and judicial oversight. A
Department of Justice discussion paper circulated to federal, provincial, and
territorial cybercrime working groups proposed three legislative options to
obtain basic subscriber information, and purportedly complying with Spencer:
(1) an administrative scheme without court approval; (2) modifications or
redesign to the judicial order process, and (3) a subscriber information request
process with a heightened expectation of privacy through a judicial court process
and a non-judicial, administrative procedure for ‘‘less sensitive subscriber
data.”47 Expanding warrantless access to voluntary disclosures of personal
information is inconsistent with the Charter. In January, 2016, the OPC urged
Parliament ‘‘to confirm the Spencer principles and clarify the very narrow scope
of circumstances in which law enforcement can obtain subscriber information
without a warrant.”48
Unfortunately, lawsuits arising from privacy violations by private
institutions and government are rarely successful in Canada in comparison to
the United States (U.S.). This is due to the limited powers of the Privacy
45
46

47

48

Ibid.
Michael Geist, ‘‘What Now? Privacy and Surveillance in Canada After the Paris
Attacks” (27 November 2015), Michael Geist (blog), online: <www.michaelgeist.ca/
2015/11/what-now-privacy-and-surveillance-in-canada-after-the-paris-attacks>.
Jim Bronskill, ‘‘RCMP Need Warrantless Access to Online Subscriber Info: Paulson”
CBC News (26 November 2015), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/paulson-rcmpsubscriber-info-warrantless-access-1.3337028>.
Daniel Therrien, ‘‘Op-ed: Federal Privacy Commissioner Urges Caution Should
Parliament Revisit Warrantless Access”, OPC News (25 January 2016), online:
<www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2016/oped_160125 _e.asp>.
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Commissioner of Canada who cannot make binding orders without evidence or
impose financial penalties for non-compliance.49 Other jurisdictions possess
markedly ‘‘more robust enforcement powers” such as significant administrative
monetary penalties.50 For example, the U.S. Federal Trade Commissioner
negotiates high-profile financial settlements regarding privacy breaches. Ordermaking powers for data protection authorities also exist in the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, Ireland, and Spain.51 These jurisdictions offer excellent examples
of effective public policy. Canada should integrate these countries’ systems and
processes while adapting the scheme to suit its specific needs. We must ensure
that there is an adequate balance between the privacy of Canadians and human
rights objectives while reserving warrantless options for matters of public safety
and national security in very precise circumstances.
The OPC continues to lack effective oversight surrounding this issue.
Although the two most controversial elements contained in Bill C-30 were
removed — warrantless mandatory basic subscriber information disclosure, and
requirements for telecom companies to develop intercept capability — the
government continues operating outside the law, often compensating companies
for their intercept capability systems. There are lawful and expeditious ways to
obtain basic subscriber information through judicial oversight. It is unclear what
other revelations could surface in coming years, and whether all companies and
government agencies remain compliant with Spencer’s principles.
In the interim, the federal government could order an impartial investigation
into its practice of obtaining subscriber information. Regardless, judicial
oversight, industry guidance, and legislative overhaul are urgently required.
Internet providers and TSPs have not committed publicly to notify customers of
government requests for data. Improved telecommunications transparency
reporting also requires Innovation, Science and Economic Development
Canada to initiate a multi-stakeholder consultation process and address its
flawed guidelines. Furthermore, future legislation could include transparency
requirements for: (1) an annual government report detailing voluntary disclosure
request data across all departments and agencies, and (2) the notification to
specific subscribers when their informational privacy is infringed. Without the
revision of far-reaching government practices that lack judicial oversight, ‘‘lawful
access” is indeed a fallacy, and it is one that invades the individual privacy of the
Canadian public.
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Ian Munroe, ‘‘Bell Data Collection Part of ‘Disturbing Trend’”, CBC News (30 October
2013), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/technology/bell-data-collection-part-of-disturbingtrend-1.2223949>.
Ibid.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, ‘‘The Case for Reforming the Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act” (May 2013), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/parl/
2013/pipeda_r_201305_e.pdf> at 6.

